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Abstract 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a modern 
communication technology, which provides authentication 
and identification through a nonphysical contact. Recently, 
the use of this technology is almost developed in healthcare 
environments. Although RFID technology can prepare 
sagacity in systems, privacy and security issues ought to be 
considered before. Recently, in 2015, Li et al. proposed 
SRTA, a hash-based RFID authentication protocol in 
medication verification for healthcare. In this paper, we 
study this protocol and show that SRTA protocol is 
vulnerable to traceability, impersonation and DoS attacks. 
So it does not provide the privacy and security of RFID end-
users. Therefore, we propose an improved secure and 
efficient RFID authentication protocol to enhance the 
performance of Li et al.’s method. Our analyze show that the 
existing weaknesses of SRTA’s protocol are eliminated in 
our proposed protocol. 
Keyword: RFID Authentication protocol, Privacy, Security, 
Telecare, Traceability attack, DoS attack, Impersonation 
attack. 
1. Introduction 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology 
has outlined a novel future for our world. Aviation, 
building management, financial services, livestock 
and animal tracking, marina, passenger transport, 
supply chain, rail way and health-care are some 
examples of RFID usages which describe the variety 
of  its application in our life [1-4]. Nowadays, the 
increased utilization of RFID systems in healthcare 
has been grown substantially, for instant patient 
tracking, wait-time monitoring, medication 
authentication and control asset management, docum-  
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ent and file tracking, laundry and waste management 
can be classified as its applications in this field [5-7]. 
As shown in Fig. 1, RFID systems consist of three 
main parts: tag, reader and back-end server. The tag is 
placed inside the products or the proposed items, for 
authentication and identification in contact with the 
readers. Tags are categorized in one of the three 
classes: active, passive and semi-active. A passive tag 
does not have any battery, so it cannot start a new 
connection unless locates in the electromagnetic field 
of the reader, to gain enough power for transmitting its 
messages. An active tag normally operates at 433MHz 
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) and has an inner battery 
which lets it to start a new conversation with the reader 
whenever it wants; Of course these properties increase 
the cost and the volume of this type of tags which 
constrain its usage in military applications, at 
microwave and ultra-wide band frequency ranges [8]. 
A semi-active tag has a battery, which only uses it to 
perform internal operations; rely on the reader’s signal 
to power their antenna and modulator [9]. The back-
end server connects to the readers through the secure 
or unsecure channels and stores all the identification 
information of the readers and the tags in its database 
for further processing. 
“98000 people annually die due to medication related 
mistakes in the United States,” reported by the 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) [10] which is the result of 
three main facts: similarity in the name of medicine, 
packing  and  types  of  labels  [11-13].  Nowadays, in  
 
Figure 1. RFID system 
order to establish confidentiality and privacy, and 
solve the problems of existing methods, new protocols 
have been proposed [13-16]; According to the state of 
the IOM, a number of those are specifically considered 
for Telecare Medicine Information System (TMIS) [5, 
17, 18]. It is undeniable that an efficient RFID security 
scheme can increase the security and privacy of RFID 
end-users significantly [19]. 
In 2011, Chen et al. [20] proposed a tamper resistant 
prescription RFID access control protocol for different 
certified readers where both authentication and access 
right authorization mechanisms were and it was 
claimed to guarantee patient’s right. In the same year, 
a new hash-based RFID mutual authentication 
protocol was proposed by Cho et al. [21]; they believe 
that their protocol makes it difficult for an attacker to 
launch an effective brute-force attack against RFID 
users. But Kim et al. [22] showed that Cho et al.’s 
protocol is weak against desynchronization attack and 
proposed a hash-based mutual authentication protocol 
to solve the security problems in Cho et al.’s protocol 
and privacy problems in previous RFID authentication 
protocols. In 2012, Yu et al. proposed a grouping proof 
protocol [23] for low cost RFID tags and showed that 
not only the number of logic gates in their protocol was 
reduced but also it requires fewer computational 
power and operation costs versus the last proposed 
protocol. In the same year, Wu et al. [24] showed that 
Yu et al.’s protocol was still vulnerable to 
impersonation attacks and proposed a lightweight 
binding proof protocol to overcome their weaknesses. 
Srivastava et al. [6] proposed a protocol in 2015 to 
strengthen the security level of common protocol, 
using hash algorithm and synchronized secret value 
shared between the tag and the back-end server; which 
was believed to be safe against various active and 
passive attacks. However, Li et al. [7] showed in 
SRTA (Secure RFID Tag Authentication) protocol 
that Srivastava et al.’s tag authentication protocol has 
security problem which let an adversary use the lost 
reader to connect to the medical back-end server. 
Moreover, they believe that Srivastava et al.’s protocol 
fails to provide mutual authentication between the 
reader and the back-end server, so they have proposed 
a secure and efficient RFID tag authentication protocol 
to overcome the mentioned weaknesses. 
 In this paper, we analyze the SRTA protocol [7] and 
show that there are still weaknesses with their 
protocol. Using timestamp in the structure of their 
protocols was the novelties of Srivastava et al. and Li 
et al. which prevents data forgery and replay attacks. 
However, we show that declaring timestamps 
explicitly through the protocol in one hand and 
inaccuracy in producing the messages on the other 
hand, lead to the tag impersonation and reader 
impersonation attacks. Moreover, expressing the 
reader and tag’s identification values through the 
authentication phases and lack of appropriate updating 
procedure put the privacy of their protocol at risk. In 
order to investigate the privacy of this protocol, we use 
Ouafi and Phan privacy model [25] and by consuming 
the mentioned vulnerabilities, we present the tag and 
reader traceability attacks on SRTA protocol [7]. 
Besides, it should be known that low cost of RFID’s 
tag results in computation and complexity restrictions 
in the tag side, but this restriction is not so serious in 
the back-end server due to the presence of powerful 
processors [19]. Therefore, we propose an improved 
version of SRTA protocol [7] that prevents the 
mentioned attacks and decreases the computation cost 
in the tag side.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the 
privacy model of Ouafi and Phan is described in 
Section 2. SRTA protocol is reviewed in Section 3. In 
Section 4, SRTA protocol is analyzed and its 
weaknesses are discussed. An improved version of Li 
et al.’s protocol is proposed in Section 5 and analyzes 
of our improved version are discussed in Section 6. 
Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 7. 
2. Privacy model of Ouafi and Phan 
Providing a confidential communication for RFID 
users is one of the main goals of each RFID 
communications scheme. As a result, studying privacy 
of the proposed authentication protocols always is 
more prominent for researchers [26-28]. In order to 
evaluate the privacy of RFID protocols, different 
models have been proposed, and one of the appropriate 
and well-known model is Ouafi and Phan privacy 
model [25], which is described in this section. It is an 
Untraceable Privacy (UPriv) model which can briefly 
mentioned as follows: 
The reader 𝑅 and the tag 𝑇 are the components of the 
model and the communications between all protocol 
parties are managed by an adversary 𝒜, based on the 
protocol definition. The following queries can be run 
by an adversary𝒜: 
∎ 𝐄𝐱𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐭𝐞 (𝑹, 𝑻, 𝒊) 𝐪𝐮𝐞𝐫𝐲: This query is categorized 
as passive attack and let the attacker 𝒜 eavesdrop the 
transmitted messages between the reader 𝑅 and the tag 
𝑇 in the 𝑖th session of the protocol. 
∎ 𝐒𝐞𝐧𝐝 (𝑼, 𝑽, 𝒊,𝒎)𝐪𝐮𝐞𝐫𝐲: An active attack is 
modeled with this query by sending the message 𝑚 
from the 𝑈 ∈ tag 𝑇 (reader 𝑅) to the 𝑉 ∈ reader 𝑅 (tag 
𝑇) in the 𝑖th session of protocol. Besides, the 
adversary 𝒜 can alter or block the exchanged 
messages. 
∎ 𝐂𝐨𝐫𝐫𝐮𝐩𝐭 (𝑻, 𝒌) 𝐪𝐮𝐞𝐫𝐲: The attacker 𝒜 is able to 
obtain 𝐾′, the secret value of the tag 𝑇 and set it to 𝐾. 
∎ 𝐓𝐞𝐬𝐭 (𝑻𝟎, 𝑻𝟏, 𝒊) 𝐪𝐮𝐞𝐫𝐲: This query allows to 
express the indistinguishability based concept of 
UPriv. After sending a Test (𝑇0, 𝑇1, 𝑖) query to an 
entity in the 𝑖th session, depending on a randomly 
chosen bit 𝑏 ∈ {0,1} generated by challenger, 
𝑇𝑏  𝜖 {𝑇0, 𝑇1} is delivered to the attacker. Adversary 𝒜 
will succeed, if it can truly guess the bit 𝑏. 
Untraceable Privacy (UPriv): In this definition a 
game 𝐺 between the attacker 𝒜 and a collected 
instances of reader and tag is taking place. An 
adversary 𝒜 runs the game 𝐺 which has the following 
phases: 
∵ Learning phase: In this phases, an adversary 𝒜 is 
permitted to send each of Execute, Send and Corrupt 
queries. 
∵ Challenge phase: An adversary 𝒜 is given a 
tag 𝑇𝑏  𝜖 {𝑇0, 𝑇1} and sends any of Execute, Send and 
Corrupt queries to 𝑇𝑏 . 
∵ Guess phase: Finally, the adversary 𝒜 terminates 
the game 𝐺 and outputs a bit 𝑏0  as a guess of the value 
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4.1 𝑖𝑓 𝑇3 − 𝑇2 > 𝑇  
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑙 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒 ( 𝑥𝑗, 𝑥𝑗−1)   
4.2 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑟
∗ , 𝐵∗  
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒 ( 𝑠𝑗, 𝑠𝑗−1) 
4.3 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑡
∗, 𝐷∗ 
4.4 𝐸 = ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ∥ 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 ∥ 𝑇1 ∥ 𝑅𝑟
∗
∥ ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑟
∗) 
4.5 𝐹 = 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 ⊕ h(𝑥𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑟
∗) 
4.6 𝐺 = ℎ(𝑠𝑗 ∥ 𝐼𝐷𝑘 ∥ 𝑇2 ∥ 𝑅𝑡
∗
∥ ℎ(𝑠𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑡
∗) 
4.7  
𝐸,𝐹,𝐺
→    
 
4.8 After successful authentication 
updates  
𝑥𝑗−1 ← 𝑥𝑗;  𝑥𝑗 ← ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑟) 
𝑠𝑗−1 ← 𝑠𝑗;  𝑠𝑗 ← ℎ(𝑠𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑡) 
 
1    𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑃𝑊𝑘    
1.1 𝑉𝑘 = ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ∥ 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘) 
1.2 𝑊𝑘 = ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ∥ 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘) ⊕ 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 ⊕𝑅𝑃𝑊𝑘 
1.3 𝑉𝑘
′ = 𝑊𝑘 ⊕𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 ⊕𝑅𝑃𝑊𝑘 
𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑘 = 𝑉𝑘
′ 
1.4 Generates 𝑅𝑟 
1.5 𝐴 = 𝑉𝑘
′ ⊕𝑅𝑟 
1.6 𝐵 = ℎ(𝑉𝑘
′ ⊕𝑇1 ⊕𝑅𝑟) 
1.7    
𝐴,𝐵,𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘,𝑇1
→         
 
 
 
3.1 𝑖𝑓 𝑇2 − 𝑇1 > 𝑇  
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑙 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  
3.2  
𝐴,𝐵,𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘,𝑇1,𝐶,𝐷,𝐼𝐷𝑘,𝑇2
←                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒  
𝐸∗ = ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ∥ 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 ∥ 𝑇1 ∥ 𝑅𝑟 ∥ ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑟) 
5.2 𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘 𝐸∗  =
 ?  𝐸 
5.3 Updating 𝑥𝑗 ← ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑟) 
5.4 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 = 𝐹 ⊕ h(𝑥𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑟) 
5.5    
𝐺
→ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Generates 𝑅𝑡 Randomly 
2.2 𝐶 = ℎ(𝑠𝑗 ∥ 𝐼𝐷𝑘) ⊕ 𝑅𝑡  
2.3 𝐷 = ℎ(ℎ(𝑠𝑗 ∥ 𝐼𝐷𝑘) ⊕ 𝑇2 ⊕𝑅𝑡)  
2.4     
𝐶,𝐷,𝐼𝐷𝑘,𝑇2
←       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 
𝐺∗ = ℎ(𝑠𝑗 ∥ 𝐼𝐷𝑘 ∥ 𝑇2 ∥ 𝑅𝑡 ∥ ℎ(𝑠𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑡) 
6.2 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑦 𝐺∗  =
 ? 𝐺 
6.3 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑠𝑗 ← ℎ(𝑠𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑡) 
Fig. 2 The SRTA protocol [7].
of 𝑏. 
The attacker 𝒜 is succeeded during playing the game 
𝐺, if it recognizes correctly whether received 𝑇0 or 𝑇1. 
The traceability level of the protocol is denoted 
by 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝐴
𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑣
(𝐾), where 𝑘 is the security parameter: 
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝐴
𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑣(𝑘) = |pr(𝒜 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠)
− pr(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑝)| 
                   = |pr(𝑏′ = 𝑏) −
1
2
|                               (1) 
where 0 ≤ 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝐴
𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑣(𝑘) ≤
1
2
. If 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝐴
𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑣(𝑘) < (𝑘), 
the protocol is traceable with negligible probability. 
3.  SRTA Protocol 
In [7], Li et al. proposed a secure RFID tag 
authentication protocol in TMIS. The connection 
between the reader and the back-end server and the 
connection between the tag and the reader is insecure. 
Their protocol is a hash based one, which uses 
timestamps in the structure of its messages to prevent 
attacks. Their protocol is depicted in Fig. 2 and 
notations that are used in this protocol are listed below: 
𝐼𝐷𝑘: The identifier of the 𝑘th tag. 
𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘: The identifier of the 𝑘th reader. 
𝑅𝑃𝑊𝑘: The password of the 𝑘th reader. 
𝑅𝑁𝐺: The Random Number Generator. 
𝑇: The timestamp. 
𝑅𝑟: The random number generated by reader. 
𝑅𝑠: The random number generated by tag. 
𝑠𝑗: The secret value used in the current 𝑗th session and 
it is mutual shared between back-end server and tag. 
𝑠𝑗−1: The secret value used in the previous session. 
Initially, the value is set to null. 
𝑥𝑗: The secret value used in the current 𝑗th session and 
it is mutual shared between back-end server and 
reader. 
𝑥𝑗−1: The secret value used in the previous session. 
Initially, the value is set to null. 
ℎ(. ): A one-way hash function. 
𝛥𝑇: The expected legitimate time interval for 
transmission delay. 
∥: Concatenation operation.   
A⊕B : Message A is XORed with message B. 
4. Analyzes of SRTA Protocol 
a. Tag Impersonation 
Li et al. try to increase the security in authentication 
procedure by using timestamps, which means that the 
reader and the back-end server will not continue the 
authentication phase, unless the inequalities {𝑇2 −
𝑇1 < 𝑇 , 𝑇3 − 𝑇2 < 𝑇} occurred. So by knowing the 
values of 𝑇 and 𝑇1, 𝑇2 and 𝑇3, the attacker tries to 
impersonate a legitimate tag to receive responses from 
the reader. It is shown that an attacker can perform this 
attack on Li et al.’s protocol [6]. This attack can be 
performed as follows, 
Learning phase: In the 𝑖th round, the attacker 
eavesdrops four successful steps of the protocol and 
obtains {𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 , 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝑇1, 𝐼𝐷𝑘 , 𝐶, 𝐷, 𝑇2} and by 
changing 𝑇2 into 𝑇′2, in which 𝑇′2 − 𝑇1 > 𝑇, he/she 
leaves the protocol unfinished. So the secret values of 
the reader and the tag are not updated.  
Attack phase: In the (𝑖 + 1)th round, the attacker starts 
a new session with the reader and acts as follows, 
a) The attacker 𝒜 receives {𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 , 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝑇1
(𝑖+1)
} 
from the reader. By knowing the value of 
𝑇1
(𝑖+1)
 in this session and 𝑇 from the 
learning phase, he/she generates the 𝑇2
(𝑖+1)
 
and responses with {𝐼𝐷𝑘 , 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝑇2
(𝑖+1)
} that 𝛽 
and 𝛾 are generated as follows, 
                          𝛽 = ℎ(𝑠𝑗 ∥ 𝐼𝐷𝑘) ⊕ 𝑅𝑡                   (2) 
               𝛾 = ℎ(ℎ(𝑠𝑗 ∥ 𝐼𝐷𝑘) ⊕ 𝑇2
(𝑖+1) ⊕𝑅𝑡)         (3) 
b) After confirming the value of 𝑇2
(𝑖+1)
 by 
calculating 𝑇 in the reader side, {𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 , 𝐴, 
𝐵, 𝑇1
(𝑖+1)
, 𝐼𝐷𝑘 , 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝑇2
(𝑖+1)
} will be sent to 
the back-end server by the reader. 
c) By receiving the response messages from the 
reader, the back-end server checks for the 
inequality (𝑇3
(𝑖+1)
− 𝑇2
(𝑖+1)
) < ΔT which will 
be accepted by choosing a correct value for 
𝑇2
(𝑖+1)
 via the attacker. As the above 
inequality holds, the back-end server acts as 
follows: 
1. Computes 𝑅𝑟
∗ = 𝐴⊕ ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ∥ 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘). 
2. Computes 𝐵∗ = ℎ(ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ∥ 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘) ⊕
𝑇1
(𝑖+1)
⊕𝑅𝑟
∗) and checks if 𝐵∗ ≟ 𝐵. 
So the back-end server successfully 
authenticates the reader.  
3. Computes 𝑅𝑡
∗ = 𝛽 ⊕ ℎ(𝑠𝑗 ∥ 𝐼𝐷𝑘). 
4. Computes 𝛾∗ = ℎ(ℎ(𝑠𝑗 ∥ 𝐼𝐷𝑘) ⊕
𝑇2
(𝑖+1) ⊕𝑅𝑡
∗) and checks if  𝛾∗ ≟ 𝛾. 
As the secret value of the tag has not 
been updated, the above equality is 
confirmed. 
Therefore, the back-end server authenticates the 
attacker as a legitimate tag.  
b. DoS Attack  
It can be shown that Li et al.’s protocol is not safe 
against DoS attack. To perform this attack, in the 𝑖th 
session of the protocol, after running four steps, when 
the back-end server wants to send messages to the 
reader, the attacker 𝒜 intercepts the transmitted 
messages and stops the protocol. As a result, the back-
end server updates 𝑠𝑗
(𝑖)
 and 𝑠𝑗−1
(𝑖)
 with ℎ(𝑠𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑡) and 
𝑠𝑗, respectively, but the tag dose not update its secret 
values. Now, the attacker 𝒜 performs the tag 
impersonation attack, presented in Section 4.a, in (𝑖 +
1)th session of the protocol. After this attack, the back-
end server updates 𝑠𝑗
(𝑖+1)
 and 𝑠𝑗−1
(𝑖+1)
 with ℎ(𝑠𝑗
(𝑖)
⊕𝑅𝑡) 
and 𝑠𝑗
(𝑖)
, respectively, but the tag dose not update its 
secret values. Consequently the tag and the back-end 
server are desynchronized in the next session and the 
back-end server cannot authenticate the tag. 
In addition, the DoS attack can be performed by 
running two consecutive tag impersonation attacks, 
described in subsection 4.a.  
c. Reader Impersonation 
In this subsection, it is shown that an attacker can 
impersonate a legitimate reader in Li et al.’s protocol 
[7]. This attack can be performed as follows: 
Learning phase: In the 𝑖th round, the attacker 
eavesdrops two successful steps of the protocol and 
obtains {𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 , 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝑇1}, intercepts the transmitted 
messages to the tag and then stops the protocol. So the 
secret values are not updated in this session. The 
attacker calculates 𝛼 as follows: 
                               𝛼 = 𝑉𝑘
′ ⊕𝑅𝑟                             (4) 
Attack phase: In the (𝑖 + 1)th round, an adversary 𝒜 
starts a new session with the tag 𝑇0 and acts as follows: 
a) In this phase, the attacker starts a session with 
a tag by sending 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 and 𝛼, stored from the 
last an unfinished session. 𝑇1
(𝑖+1)
 generated 
by the attacker 𝒜 which shows the current 
timestamp and 𝜆 which is calculated as 
                   𝜆 = ℎ(𝑉𝑘
′ ⊕𝑇1
(𝑖+1)
⊕𝑅𝑟)                    (5) 
b) Then, the target tag responds {𝐼𝐷𝑘 ,𝐶, 𝐷, 
𝑇2
(𝑖+1)
} to the attacker. 
c) The attacker 𝒜 sends {𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘, 𝛼, 𝜆, 𝑇1
(𝑖+1)
, 
𝐼𝐷𝑘 , 𝐶, 𝐷, 𝑇2
(𝑖+1)
} to the back-end server . 
d) The back-end server checks if (𝑇3
(𝑖+1) −
𝑇2
(𝑖+1)) < 𝑇. As shown in Fig. 2, this 
inequality is verified because of generation of  
𝑇2
(𝑖+1)
 and 𝑇3
(𝑖+1)
 by a legal tag and back-end 
server. 
e) By performing the above steps, the back-end 
server computes 𝑅𝑟
∗ = 𝛼 ⊕ ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ∥ 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘). 
f) The back-end server calculates 𝐵∗ =
ℎ(ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ∥ 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘) ⊕ 𝑇1
(𝑖+1)
⊕𝑅𝑟
∗) and checks 
whether 𝐵∗ ≟ 𝜆 where 
𝐵∗ = ℎ(ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ∥ 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘) ⊕ 𝑇1
(𝑖+1) ⊕𝑅𝑟
∗) 
= ℎ(𝑉𝑘
′ ⊕𝑇1
(𝑖+1) ⊕𝑅𝑟
∗)  
                   = 𝜆                                                (6) 
As a result, the back-end server authenticates the 
spoofed reader as a legitimate one. 
g) Now, the back-end server starts to 
authenticate the tag by calculating 𝐶∗ and 𝐷∗ 
and comparing them with the received 𝐶 
and 𝐷. As the tag is legitimate, so the back 
end server authenticates it and computes 𝐸, 𝐹 
and 𝐺 as follows and sends them to the 
attacker: 
𝐸 = ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ∥ 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 ∥ 𝑇1
(𝑖+1) ∥ 𝑅𝑟 ∥ h(𝑥𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑟))(7) 
       𝐹 = 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 ⊕ ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑟)                                 (8) 
       𝐺 = ℎ(𝑠𝑗 ∥ 𝐼𝐷𝑘 ∥ 𝑇2
(𝑖+1) ∥ 𝑅𝑡 ∥ h(𝑠𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑡))   (9) 
h) The attacker 𝒜 sends 𝐺 to the tag. 
Consequently, the attacker effectively impersonate the 
reader. 
d. Tag traceability  
In this subsection, it is shown that SRTA protocol [7] 
is vulnerable against traceability attack. According to 
SRTA protocol [7], it can be seen that the tag’s 
identification number 𝐼𝐷𝑘  is fixed in all rounds. Using 
this issue, an attacker can trace the target tag. This 
attack is performed as follows: 
Learning phase: In round (𝑖), the attacker 𝒜 
eavesdrops all transmitted messages between the tag 
𝑇0 and the reader 𝑅 by sending an 
Execute query (𝑅, 𝑇0, 𝑖) and obtaining { 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 , 𝐴, 𝐵, 
𝑇1, 𝐼𝐷𝑘 , 𝐶, 𝐷, 𝑇2, 𝐸, 𝐹, 𝐺}.  
Challenge phase: The adversary 𝒜 selects two fresh 
tags 𝑇0 and 𝑇1 for test, and sends 
a Test query(𝑇0, 𝑇1, 𝑖 + 1). According to the 
randomly chosen bit 𝑏 𝜖 {0,1}, the adversary is given 
a tag 𝑇𝑏  𝜖 {𝑇0, 𝑇1}. Afterwards, the adversary 𝒜 
calculates 𝐵# as ℎ(𝐴 ⊕ 𝑇1
′) and sends an 
Execute query(𝑅, 𝑇𝑏 , 𝑖 + 1) by sending 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘, 𝐴, 𝐵
#, 
𝑇1
′ to the tag ,which 𝑇1
′ is the current timestamp, and 
obtains 𝐶′, 𝐷′, 𝑇′2 and 𝐼𝐷𝑘 . 
Guess phase: The adversary 𝒜 stops the game 𝐺, and 
outputs a bit 𝑏′ 𝜖 {0, 1} as a guess of bit 𝑏 as follows.  
𝑏′ = {     
0                𝑖𝑓 𝐶 = 𝐶′               
1                𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒             
                        (10) 
As a result, it can be written: 
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝐴
𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣(𝑘) =  
 |𝑝𝑟(𝑏′ = 𝑏) −
1
2
| = |1 −
1
2
| =
1
2
 ≫ 𝜀                       (11) 
Proof: According to the structure of SRTA protocol 
[7], since the tag 𝑇0 does not ever update its 
identification number and uses the same 𝐼𝐷𝑘  in both 
learning and challenge phases, the attacker can trace 
the target tag. Moreover, as 𝐼𝐷𝑘 is fixed in all sessions, 
the attacker 𝒜 is able to trace the tag 𝑇0, whenever 
he/she wants.  
e. Reader traceability Attack on SRTA 
Protocol 
Li et al. [7] distinguished that Srivastava et al.’s 
protocol [6] suffers from reader stolen/lost attack, so it 
fails in providing the privacy of tag during the 
authentication phases. To resist these attacks, Li et al. 
[7] use a secret value, identifier and a password for 
reader in their protocol. In this subsection, it is shown 
that in Li et al.’s protocol, an attacker can perform 
traceability attack and traces the location of a specific 
reader. As shown in Fig. 1, the adversary 𝒜 can trace 
the reader 𝑅0 as follows: 
Learning phase: In round (𝑖), the attacker 𝒜 
eavesdrops all transmitted messages between the tag 
𝑇0 and the reader 𝑅0 by sending an 
Execute query (𝑅0 , 𝑇0, 𝑖), obtaining { 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘, 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝑇1, 
𝐼𝐷𝑘 , 𝐶, 𝐷, 𝑇2, 𝐸, 𝐹, 𝐺}, then he/she stores 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘  as 𝜁. 
Challenge phase: The adversary 𝒜 eavesdrops every 
sessions between readers and tags and stores all the 
obtained 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘  with the name of  𝑍
𝑖, 
where 𝑖𝜖{1,2, … , 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠}. Afterwards, 
the adversary 𝒜 selects two fresh readers 𝑅0 and 𝑅1 
for test, and sends a Test query(𝑅0, 𝑅1, 𝑖 + 1). 
According to the randomly chosen bit 𝑏 𝜖 {0,1}, the 
adversary is given a reader 𝑅𝑏 𝜖 {𝑅0, 𝑅1}. Now the 
attacker sends an Execute query (𝑅0 , 𝑇0, 𝑖 + 1) and 
stores  𝑍0 and 𝑍1. 
Guess phase: The adversary 𝒜 stops the game 𝐺, and 
outputs a bit 𝑏′ 𝜖 {0, 1} as a guess of bit 𝑏 as follows:  
𝑏′ = {     0                𝑖𝑓 𝜁 = 𝑍
0               
1                𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒             
                   (12)      
As a result, it can be written: 
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝐴
𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣(𝑘) =  
= |𝑝𝑟(𝑏′ = 𝑏) −
1
2
| = |1 −
1
2
| =
1
2
𝜀                        (13)               
Proof: According to the structure of Li et al.’s 
protocol, the reader 𝑅0 will not update its 
identification number and uses the same 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 in both 
Learning and Challenge phases, therefore the attacker 
can trace the target reader. Furthermore, as 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘  is 
fixed in all rounds, an adversary 𝒜 is able to trace the 
reader 𝑅0 in every arbitrary session. 
5. Improvements on SRTA Protocol 
Li et al. [7] try to improve the Srivastava et al.’s 
authentication protocol [6] by adding the secret value 
of the reader 𝑥𝑗 , the Kth reader identifier and password 
which are named, respectively, by 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 and 𝑅𝑃𝑊𝑘. 
However, SRTA protocol [7] is vulnerable to attacks 
declared in Section 4. In this Section, a strengthened 
versions of SRTA protocol [7] is proposed to 
overcome its weaknesses. Also, the security and 
privacy analysis of our proposed protocol is provided. 
5.1 Improved Version of SRTA protocol 
As reported in Section 4, there are several main 
drawbacks in the structure of the Li et al.’s protocol 
[7], which make it vulnerable to traceability attacks. Li 
et al. [7] try to increase the efficiency of the Srivastava 
et al.’s protocol [6] by expressing the tag’s identifier 
𝐼𝐷𝑘  and 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘  through the protocol, explicitly. 
Although SRTA protocol [7] decreases the waiting 
time for accessing the true readers and ensuring a high 
rate of efficiency in the tag authentication procedure, 
but it brings a drawback which ables the attacker to 
know the tag and reader’s identification value. This 
leads to trace them in every execution of the protocol. 
In addition, the processors in the tags are limited and 
all computations cannot be performed in the tag side. 
On the other hand, there is little limitation for the 
computation cost in the back-end server side [19]. 
Therefore, we propose to omit sending 𝐼𝐷𝑘  through 
the protocol. Besides, there is not any inconsistency 
between the increased time for finding a correct 𝐼𝐷𝑘  
and 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 with the timestamp 𝑇3. In other words, in 
SRTA protocol [7], the back-end server first 
investigates the correctness of an inequality (𝑇3 −
𝑇2 < 𝑇), then explores for the true identification 
number of the reader and the tag. Further, we omit 
sending 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 through our protocol. One of the other 
drawbacks of SRTA protocol [7] is announcing the 
value of timestamps T1, T2 and T3, through the 
protocol. After one run of the protocol acceptably, an 
adversary 𝒜 knows the value of T1, T2 and T3, so 
he/she can calculate the allowable 𝑇 and applying the 
tag impersonation and reader impersonation attack 
which are discussed in Section 4. In order to improve 
Li et al.’s protocol [7], we change the message 𝐵 to: 
                   𝐵 = ℎ(R(𝑉𝑘
′) ∥ L(𝑅𝑟) ⊕ 𝑇1)              (14) 
where R(𝑉𝑘
′) means the right side of 𝑉𝑘
′ and L(𝑅𝑟) refer 
to the left side of 𝑅𝑟. By omitting T1, we send {𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 , 
𝐴, 𝐵} to the tag in the second step of the protocol. In 
the third step of the protocol, we change the message 
𝐷 to: 
                      𝐷 = ℎ(𝑅𝑡 ⊕𝑇2)                              (15) 
Not only by omitting the first hash function of the 
message 𝐷, the computation cost in the tag side 
decreases, but also the back-end server can verify the 
value of 𝑅𝑡 using the transmitted message 𝐷. 
Moreover, in our proposed protocol the attacker will 
not be able to guess the correct message. 
On the other  hand, updating  the  tag’s  identifier  𝐼𝐷𝑘
          Back-end Server                                                               Reader                                                           Tag 
 (𝐼𝐷𝑘
𝑜𝑙𝑑 , 𝐼𝐷𝑘
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𝑜𝑙𝑑 , 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘
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4.1 𝑖𝑓 𝑇3 − 𝑇2 > 𝑇  
            𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑙 
      𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ ( 𝑥𝑗 , 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘
𝑜𝑙𝑑) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑥𝑗−1, 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘
𝑛𝑒𝑤)   
   4.2 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑉𝑘
∗ 
           𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑟
∗ 
              𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝐵∗ 
      4.3 𝑖𝑓 𝐵∗ = 𝐵 
                  𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 
            𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑙 
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 
( 𝑠𝑗, 𝐼𝐷𝑘
𝑜𝑙𝑑) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑠𝑗−1, 𝐼𝐷𝑘
𝑛𝑒𝑤) 
    4.4 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑡
∗, 𝐷∗ 
    4.5 𝑖𝑓 𝐷∗ = 𝐷 
              𝑇𝑎𝑔 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 
          𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑙 
4.6 𝐸 = ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ∥ 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 ∥ 𝑇1 ∥ 𝑅𝑟
∗ ∥ ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑟
∗) 
4.7 𝐹 = 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 ⊕ h(𝑥𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑟
∗) 
4.8 𝐺 = ℎ(𝑠𝑗 ∥ 𝐼𝐷𝑘 ∥ 𝑇2 ∥ 𝑅𝑡
∗ ∥ ℎ(𝑠𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑡
∗) 
4.9  
                           𝐸,𝐹,𝐺                            
→                        
 
4.10 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  
𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  
𝑥𝑗−1 ← 𝑥𝑗;  𝑥𝑗 ← ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑟) 
𝑠𝑗−1 ← 𝑠𝑗;  𝑠𝑗 ← 𝑠𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑡 
𝐼𝐷𝑘
𝑜𝑙𝑑 ← 𝐼𝐷𝑘 
𝐼𝐷𝑘
𝑛𝑒𝑤 ← 𝐼𝐷𝑘 ⊕𝑠𝑗 
 
1    𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑃𝑊𝑘    
1.1 𝑉𝑘 = ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ∥ 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘) 
1.2 𝑊𝑘 = ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ∥ 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘) ⊕ 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 ⊕𝑅𝑃𝑊𝑘 
1.3 𝑉𝑘
′ = 𝑊𝑘 ⊕𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 ⊕𝑅𝑃𝑊𝑘 
𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑘 = 𝑉𝑘
′ 
     1.4 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑟 
     1.5 𝐴 = 𝑉𝑘
′ ⊕𝑅𝑟 
     1.6 𝐵 = ℎ(R(𝑉𝑘
′) ∥ L(𝑅𝑟) ⊕ 𝑇1) 
1.7    
                𝐴,𝐵                   
→               
 
 
3.1 𝑖𝑓 𝑇2 − 𝑇1 > 𝑇  
              𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑙 
      𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  
3.2  
                    𝐴,𝐵,𝑇1,𝐶,𝐷,𝑇2                           
←                         
 
 
 
2.1 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑦 
2.2 𝐶 = ℎ(𝑠𝑗 ∥ 𝐼𝐷𝑘) ⊕ 𝑅𝑡  
2.3 𝐷 = ℎ(𝑅𝑡 ⊕𝑇2 ) 
2.4     
                    𝐶,𝐷,𝑇2                        
←                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒  
𝐸∗ = ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ∥ 𝑅𝐼𝐷𝑘 ∥ 𝑇1 ∥ 𝑅𝑟 ∥ ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑟) 
5.2 𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘 𝐸∗  =
 ?  𝐸 
5.3 Updating 𝑥𝑗 ← ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑟) 
5.4 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 = 𝐹 ⊕ h(𝑥𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑟) 
5.5    
                      𝐺                            
→                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 
𝐺∗ = ℎ(𝑠𝑗 ∥ 𝐼𝐷𝑘 ∥ 𝑇2 ∥ 𝑅𝑡 ∥ ℎ(𝑠𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑡) 
6.2 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑦 𝐺∗  =
 ? 𝐺 
6.3 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑠𝑗 ← 𝑠𝑗 ⊕𝑅𝑡 
𝐼𝐷𝑘 ← 𝐼𝐷𝑘 ⊕𝑠𝑗 
Fig. 3 Improved version of SRTA protocol. 
  
through the protocol causes another vulnerability, i.e., 
DoS attack. In other words, after running four steps of 
the protocol successfully, the attacker intercepts the 
protocol and leaves it unfinished. So the back-end 
server updates 𝐼𝐷𝑘  with 𝐼𝐷𝑘 ⊕𝑅𝑡, while the value of 
𝐼𝐷𝑘  in the tag is not updated. Now in the next run of 
the protocol, the tag will send 𝐼𝐷𝑘 to the reader but the 
back-end server will not admit it as a legitimate one. 
So, we store two values for 𝐼𝐷𝑘  in the back-end server 
as a new and old ones. Moreover, we update 𝐼𝐷𝑘  at the 
end of the protocol as follows: 
                             𝐼𝐷𝑘 ← 𝐼𝐷𝑘 ⊕ 𝑠𝑗                         (16) 
and stores two last value of 𝐼𝐷𝑘 in the back-end server 
side. As we mentioned above, restriction of 
complexity in the tag side is an important issue, so by 
omitting one hash function in tag, we change the 
updated value of 𝐼𝐷 as eq. 16. The improved protocol 
is depicted in Fig. 3. 
6. Analyzes of our proposed protocol 
Eavesdropping and Tracing Resistance 
Our proposed protocol is resistant to eavesdropping 
and tracing attacks. An adversary is not able to trace 
the target tag 𝑇0, because of updating 𝐼𝐷𝑘 as 𝐼𝐷𝑘 ⊕ 𝑠𝑗, 
in addition 𝑠𝑗 is updated at the end of protocol with 𝑅𝑡 
which is generated randomly and is not known to the 
attacker 𝒜. So the barrier against tracing is raised 
through the use of random numbers and anonymity. 
Desynchronization Attack Resistance  
In desynchronization attack, the adversary forces the 
tag and the reader to update their secret values to 
different ones. So, they will not authenticate each 
other in further transactions. In an RFID 
authentication protocol, the adversary can perform this 
attack via various approaches including blocking 
exchanged messages between the tag and the back-end 
server and impersonating the tag and the reader [29, 
30]. In our protocol, an adversary is not able to forge 
the tag and  the reader  to  update  their  secret  values, 
Table 1. Security level comparisons among the discussed protocol  
 
              Feature           
  Protocols  
 
𝐹1 
 
 
𝐹2 
 
 
𝐹3 
 
 
𝐹4 
 
 
𝐹5 
 
Cho et al. [21] NO YES NO NO NO 
Srivastava et al. [6] NO YES NO NO YES 
Li et al. [7] YES NO NO YES NO 
Our protocol YES YES YES YES YES 
 
𝐹1: Provision of mutual authentication 
𝐹2: Provision of synchronized secret 
𝐹3: Protection of data privacy 
𝐹4: Prevention of reader stolen/lost attack 
𝐹5: Prevention of impersonation attack 
Table 2. Performance features of various protocols 
 
       Feature 
 
  Protocols  
 
complexity 
of tag 
computation 
 
 
complexity 
of reader 
computation 
 
 
Communication 
rounds 
 
Srivastava et 
al. [6] 
5H+RNG RNG 5 
Li et al. [7] 3H+RNG RNG 5 
Our protocol 3H+RNG RNG 5 
H hash function, RNG random number generator 
 
because of storing two values of 𝐼𝐷𝑘  in the back-end 
server, which prevent desynchronization between the 
tag and the back-end server. 
Tag/Reader impersonation Attack Resistance 
Tag (Reader) impersonation attack is a forgery attack, 
in which an RFID system accepts a spoofed tag 
(reader) as a legitimate tag (reader). In our improved 
protocol, because of the new exposure of 𝐵 and 𝐷, an 
adversary 𝒜 is not able to build the messages 𝐵 and 𝐷 
from 𝐴 and 𝐶. Furthermore, because of updating the 
secret values and generation of new random variables 
in each session, the eavesdropped messages from the 
last session are not acceptable in the new session. 
6.1 Performance analysis of our proposed 
protocol 
In Table 1, our improved protocol is compared with 
some similar protocols. As it can be seen, the proposed 
protocol provides security against the mentioned 
attacks including traceability, impersonation, mutual 
authentication and DoS. In addition, in Table 2, the 
efficiency of the proposed protocols is compared with 
the analyzed protocols, by comparing its 
computational cost. Moreover, qualitative values of 
our proposed protocol is evaluated over discussed 
pervious protocols. 
7. Conclusion 
RFID Technology is rapidly developing and its 
applications are spreading in different fields, but 
providing their security and privacy is the goal of 
researchers in recent years. In this paper, we analyzed 
a hash based RFID protocol in TMIS, proposed by Li 
et al.. They claimed that their protocol provides 
privacy requirements for RFID systems. However, this 
paper showed that Li et al.’s protocol is still vulnerable 
to traceability, tag impersonation and DoS attacks and 
to fix the aforementioned weaknesses, we have 
proposed an improvement, which fixes the weak 
features of their protocol for healthcare environments. 
Finally, the computational complexity and the 
performance of the proposed protocol is compared with 
discussed protocols. 
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